Robert Habeck
Europe Can Only Regulate What It Builds: On AI, Energy, War and Leadership
#19 Robert Habeck - Europe Can Only Regulate What It Builds: On AI, Energy, War and Leadership
· 01:17:52
The past years reshaped Europe more than any decade since the end of the Cold War: war returned, energy systems fractured, AI accelerated, and political extremes gained ground. We spoke with someone who stood at the center of these shifts: Robert Habeck, former German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action.
Recorded just months after leaving office, this conversation goes far beyond headlines.
We discuss Europe’s execution gap and regulatory identity, the tensions between short-term energy decisions and long-term climate goals, and whether real strategic autonomy in energy and technology is achievable. We explore Draghi’s competitiveness agenda, Europe’s response to the IRA and China, and what it would take to prevent a deep-tech exodus.
We also talk about the war in Ukraine and how it reshaped long-held Green ideas on pacifism; Europe’s role in a fragmenting global order; the rising electricity needs of AI and data centres; and the question of whether next-generation nuclear must return to Europe’s strategic debate.
Finally, Robert reflects on leadership under pressure, stepping out of the “corset” of Berlin politics, his message to Gen Z, and whether he could imagine returning to political office.
An unusually open conversation about power, responsibility, uncertainty & the future of Europe.
Now available on all major platforms.
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Key claims
“So yes, we could set the standards, but we need the economic strengths for the techniques that we try to regulate.”
“Now at least two defining pillars of it are gone or broken, maybe not completely gone, but they are harmed in a way.”
“Nobody, even not Germany, has the financial firepower to solve this problem. This needs to be private money as well.”
“So I would say in critical infrastructure, public data, defense data, security data, they should not be stored on American and obviously not Chinese servers, but that must be a European cloud system.”
“Neutrality does not mean that you don't have any responsibility.”
Transcript
This transcript was generated automatically (YouTube auto-captions) and then edited for readability: names and obvious mis-hearings corrected, filler words removed, speaker labels added where the speaker is clear. Passages that could not be understood are marked [unclear]; short omitted passages are marked [...]. Timestamps are approximate. The recording is the authoritative version.
Konstantin Girst 00:00:01
Welcome back to a new episode of Campus To Capital. And as you usually know, we normally start with introducing our guests by their roles and past achievements. But I think today the name of our guest is enough of an introduction, as Julius and I are joined by Robert Habeck today, who's the former Vice Chancellor of Germany. We're super honored to have you here today. So
Thank you very much.
Yeah, it's a pleasure.
Host 00:00:41
Yeah. And I mean, I think we have a lot on the agenda today, but before we delve into everything seriously, how are you doing today?
Robert Habeck 00:00:53
Good. I mean, here in Copenhagen it's an interesting day. Tonight there's a big football game, but we have also local elections in Copenhagen. So I did my duty and went to vote in the morning, and so it's an interesting day. And tonight, after we did our podcast and I have another meeting at, I think, 7:00, I will watch television and see what's the outcome of the battle of Copenhagen, as they call it. So it's a good day.
Host 00:01:22
Interesting. That's certainly good to hear.
Yeah, exactly. So, but then, before we dive into the more serious and maybe also more contemporary topics, I think an interesting thing to hear for listeners would be what initially motivated you to go into politics.
Robert Habeck 00:01:40
I would consider myself as always being a politically interested person, but I was not in party politics. So I mean, I guess I did kind of the same as everyone who has some motivation did. I was in the, how do you call it, government of our school council, then later in university something of the same. In my time there was a military duty, so I went into civil service, and also there I tried to develop some newspaper kind of thing.
But the decision to go into party politics came when I had the feeling that now, after a period of traveling around, I have founded a family, I bought a house, and the perspective was now for the next, I don't know, 20 years or so, this will be home. And with this feeling of this will be home, I really felt the necessary to engage into then local politics. So I went to the Green Party. I mean, the Greens were obviously the party I always voted for, but I had, well, maybe not several, but some attempts to join the party, but it doesn't really made sense for me because I was traveling so much, and all the towns I lived in, Hamburg, Lüneburg, Freiburg, before, they were just a period.
But now, at that time, I think it was in 2002, I had the feeling now I'm settled and this is the right time to take responsibility, and then I entered party politics.
Host
Great. I mean, it's I think a very honorable thing to do, as I think, I mean, obviously all of us are impacted by political outcomes, but then I think most people would still opt against sacrificing their own time and maybe also personal objectives to engage for the greater good. So it's nice to hear how someone gets that motivation.
I agree. I mean, on this podcast we usually engage with different people from different backgrounds. We have people from the research side. We had entrepreneurs,
executives, as you might call them. But when we talked to them, there was a persistent theme that emerged when they talked about Europe and Europe's sovereignty, Europe's competitiveness in comparison to the US and China mostly. And they all said basically that we don't lack talent, we lack execution, that there's an execution gap, and they attributed this gap partially to the regulatory fragmentation in Europe. And I mean, we do have high regulatory standards in Europe. There's the Brussels effect. And an example would be the AI Act, that we are at the forefront of AI regulation in Europe. But I mean, from your perspective, as being someone that really worked at the center of this equation, is this regulatory-first approach a strategic asset, or does it slow down innovation? Yeah, unnecessarily.
Robert Habeck 00:05:06
Well, you could set the standards if you have the financial and economic power. And I think this is now the problem, that Europe in the past had this power and now it [unclear] in a way. So looking back, you can, I think, make some arguments that the Europeans should have seen it coming. Especially the development in China and Russia was not a secret. And especially Germany, I mean, this is the economy I know best, of course, they looked the other way. All the warnings they pushed aside. So a lot of people argued, after the first war Putin waged on Ukraine in 2014, it's a stupid, maybe ridiculous thing to increase the energy dependency. The Americans warned us. The East Europeans warned the Germans. But still, the Germans pushed on and forward.
And after Nord Stream 1, the decision for Nord Stream 2 was actually made in 2015. So one year after the first attempt of Putin to invade Ukraine, the Germans decided, well, it's a good idea to be even more dependent on Russian gas than before. Now, looking back, this was a complete political mistake and a big failure. China, I
would say, you could see the development in China, including the automotive industry, also years before. Now the results are there. But I mean, this is just complaining about the past and maybe mistakes made in the past. Now the situation for Europe is that we have really improved our competitiveness, otherwise no one will listen to us. And if we are developing the techniques that will define the future markets, then we could regulate them. But this is the question, if we find the power. I would say yes. We have all the possibilities. We have, especially in Germany, the financial powers. All the talents are there. We have a very strong research and university environment. So, but we have to use it, and this is the question. Otherwise we try to regulate Chinese platforms like TikTok or American platforms like X, but we don't have our own, how do you say, platform or maybe technique. And this is especially important for AI. So yes, we could set the standards, but we need the economic strengths for the techniques that we try to regulate.
Host
But in proximity to that, would you say that there's a trade-off between living a liberal democratic society as we know it and being at the forefront of innovation? Because
right now I feel like that's the trade-off we have to deal with.
Robert Habeck
Well, I would argue that, first of all, for me the European Union is a great achievement. And if I could have one political wish, or one, I would say, set vision, then it's more Europe. So I see all the problems, red tape and bureaucracy, yes, but solving the problem should lead to more Europe, a more unified Europe, not question the European Union as the political framework for, I would say, all the European politicians. So this is my analysis. And more Europe means, of course, a better Europe and a more competitive Europe, but everything we try to do should be to strengthen the European Union and create an even more united European Union. And no country in Europe should think that in this competition between elephants, Russia, China, US, India, Denmark, as we are speaking, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, but also not Germany and France, could make any difference. Europe could and should, actually. So I would always argue to find a more common
European approach. As difficult as it is, I can tell you from the practice, it's always hard. I mean, this is nice talking now, but when it comes to concrete action, everyone finds something to oppose a common European approach. So it's really hard work and tough work. But for Germany, I think it's completely clear what the future role would be. We need, in a way, leadership, but not, as it is Germany and we have this history in Europe, not a leadership where we say, well, we are the biggest, we are the strongest, everyone listen, now this is the way forward, we lead. Nobody will listen to us. But helping finding the way, so leading in the second row, in a way. That's the German role. And I hope we find the inner strength to adapt to this role.
Host 00:10:26
I mean, when we look at certain macroeconomic shocks that we experienced this year, I think we can hopefully bear a benefit of a stronger Europe, as they potentially have served as a wake-up call to some people. And I think you earlier already mentioned some buzzwords for my next question, because when we look at the situation for Europe and also Germany, obviously the past years had a lot of troubling events, when we look at COVID and the invasion of Ukraine and then resulting energy shocks and inflation. And there are a lot of difficult things to balance that come with that, as a politician but also as a country as a whole. How do you think, or what was your approach maybe, to balance political leadership and also having strategic clarity with all of these difficult topics going on at the same time?
Robert Habeck
Well, first of all, I would argue that some of the crises you mentioned are, yeah, they are universal, but some have a very specific outcome for Germany. So COVID-19 hit everyone. I don't know how these waves of the disease went through Europe. Maybe there was a period where Germany was more infected than others. I don't know. But it was a universal crisis, in a way. The finance crisis was a universal crisis. But the energy crisis and the specific turmoil in economics is very German, I would say, because we
were dependent from Russian gas. That's not a problem for Portugal or for Spain. Not for Norway, obviously, as they are producing gas. Not for Denmark, as they had a pipeline to Norway. They made them independent before the war started. So it was very much us and Austria and maybe Czech Republic that were affected. And also the huge dependency on trade with China is very specific for Germany. We, the Germans, 45 to 50% of the GDP growth in Germany depends on exports. That is unprecedented. So this is basically the explanation why Germany still is the third largest economy in the world. We are only 80 million Germans. So the other ones are the US and China. So how do we do this? Well, we trade. We sell our goods to the world. Meaning that the strength is also a potential weakness when the world is not open and free trade is not the unifying idea. But suddenly tariffs are everywhere. Geopolitics are entering politics. Everything is weaponized: energy, trade, raw materials, critical minerals, even semiconductors. So suddenly you become vulnerable because you are so open to international markets. And this is also very specific for the German economy. So we have at least two problems inside Europe, in the biggest economy of Europe, that are
very specific for Germany, which, well, they're coming out of global turmoil, I would say, but the outcome is very specific for the German economy. Therefore it's so hard to find solutions. Therefore Germany is struggling so much. Therefore all the other countries are now overcoming the energy shock after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but Germany, and also the other countries, the central European countries that had been more dependent, plus the dependency on trade with international markets, in brackets China, is affecting the German economy so hard. So Germany really has to invent its business model, because I can't see that the gas of Russia, at least the dependency as once planned, is coming back soon. I hope not, actually. And I don't see that Xi Jinping will change his strategy in the next month and say, well, this was just a period and now I order all the electric automotive industries to stop producing. That's going to happen. So we, the Germans, really have to find something new, and this will take a while, actually. So the bloody truth, the honest answer to the Germans and to the Europeans therefore and to German economies is: we created this strong economy over the past 30 years. Now at least two defining pillars of it are gone or broken, maybe not completely gone, but they are harmed in a way. Now
we have to do something new, invent something new, and this takes one, two, three, four, five years. So this, I think, is the problem, that Friedrich Merz said, well, vote for me, when I'm chancellor tomorrow everything is different. And I mean, we had a shrinking potential growth in Germany, so the possibility to grow in the economy shrank, like 10, 15, 12 years ago, to 0.5%. So that means that if everything is really working fine, there's no crisis and everyone is in a good mood and people are spending the money they have saved, now the potential that we can use is only half a percentage. That's not enough. So we have really to develop a new approach for the German economy. And well, it's a hard but honest answer.
Host 00:15:55
Yeah. And I mean, despite everything you just said, there are also some underlying commitments we have to make. I mean, we have some climate goals that we work towards, right?
Robert Habeck 00:16:10
Yes. But from my point of view, these are opportunities now. I mean, you can argue, I mean, I'm from the Green Party and all my life I worked for climate action, so obviously I'm convinced that this is the right thing to do. For me it's a moral question, basically. But even if you doubt it, you'll have to see what's happening in the world. And now, as the COP is going on while we're talking, China is really moving forward with renewable energy. So I would argue, if you only look at the economic numbers, at the figures, we are beyond the point of political decision making, if we want renewable energy or not. I doubt that Xi Jinping is the biggest advocate for climate action. I've never seen him on a Fridays for Future demonstration, actually. But he knows that this is the cheapest form of energy. This is the way to make his country maybe not independent, but maybe less vulnerable from fossil energy imports to China, from Russia, to say the least. So he is really pushing the electrification agenda, with the outcome that batteries, electric vehicles, not only solar panels, wind turbines, everything becomes cheaper. Now this means that at least the developing countries, Southeast Asia, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, they will really invest into renewable energy in the future. And I would argue for the German economy, the only question is: do we want to have our part in it in this developing market, or do we leave it all to the Chinese?
But if we leave it all to the Chinese, then we have not really something to sell to the world, because the rest of the world will go into this direction. So from my point of view, it's an opportunity, because we have all the knowledge still in Germany. So we should not question the future, but work for the future.
Host
But I mean, you obviously have the expertise. What do you see as the main reason, or is there an opportunity or a solution that you could think of? Because I recently read the book Tech War by Wolfgang Hun [unclear]. I don't know if
Robert Habeck
I haven't read it.
Host 00:18:19
Okay. But
Robert Habeck 00:18:20
Sounds familiar. I know why.
Host
He describes the issue as that China is able to integrate basically every step of their value chain vertically and has no dependence on any other actor in the market. Would you say that could be a solution, trying to build up from scratch a value chain that has every step vertically?
Robert Habeck
Of course, China, or the Chinese government, can do some things that we should not wish to do ourselves, like over the heads of the people decide, well, there's a mine, you have to move your village and we exploit the mine, no matter what, and no protest is allowed. And you know, I mean, if I say authoritarian, this is maybe too weak. But I say now, for the lack of better words, this is an authoritarian-run country, and we should not wish to be like China. So they can do things that are not possible to do in Germany and not possible to do in Europe, rightly so. But this does not mean that we have no chance of competing. I mean, open markets and a liberal democracy have more possibilities, include more people, are more creative than authoritarian-run governments or countries. The only thing that I think we should adopt from China is, or maybe two things. First, don't
question all the time the decisions we made. So we had a plan in Europe, becoming climate neutral. A lot of investments are in the pipeline. Lots of investments are made. Don't slow down the process, but speed up. I mean, the one thing I can't understand is that the automotive industry in Germany is saying we have a problem to develop climate-neutral cars in the next 10 years. I mean, they have the cars, basically, they just have to produce them. But problems that cannot be solved in 10 years are problems we could not solve. We should solve every problem in like one year's time or maybe two years' time. And we can, and the Germans and the European economy have proven it time and time again that this is possible. But this is the second thing we should learn from China: strengthen the back and say, well, now we are in a world of competition and geopolitics, we won't lose this game, so we decided to take on the fight. And in the fight it is. So the world where everyone is nice and loving to each other, this world is gone. So stick to the plan and try to work for it and maybe try to fight for it. I think these are the two things we should learn from China, and then the rest is politics.
Host
And when we talk about European competitiveness and the power demand, I mean,
I read a report by Goldman Sachs that was published earlier this month, where they said that they expect global power demand to increase by 165% after 2030 compared to 2023 levels, which is obviously due to a main chunk of innovation in the tech space right now and demand for data centers, et cetera. And the former director of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, he published, or he was ordered to publish, a report on European competitiveness, which I'm sure you've had a look at. And in that he suggests that at least another 800 billion euros should be invested
and 300 of them into energy.
Host 00:22:01
Yes, exactly. And you also mentioned the idea of purchasing power agreements, to create direct contracts between energy suppliers and companies that are in demand of that power. And I was wondering, what is your stance on that, and do you think that that is a step in the right direction?
Robert Habeck
So the Draghi report, I think, is kind of the Bible, and everyone in Europe has to give an oath on the Bible to work for this competitiveness. And I think not only just give an oath, but look into it. And you're right, I think the crucial thing for everything is now lack of investment. This is especially true for Germany. And a lot of the things you at least commented on: energy prices, cutting red tape, getting rid of bureaucracy, developing a workforce that is big enough. I mean, we have obviously stagnation in Germany. We had it now over the past, basically starting in 2018. So the German economy hasn't grown since 2018. So it's almost, what do we have now, it's almost eight years now of stagnation in Germany, and we have a lack of workforce. So imagine the German economy would grow again, the workforce demand would be even bigger. So this is a bigger obstacle for creating potential growth in Germany again. But this comes all down to one question: do we find enough money to be invested into the European markets and the German markets? And I think
the Draghi report is showing, or is leading the way. These 800 billion euros can't come from public money. Not alone. So of course public money should play a part in it. But this is impossible. Nobody, even not Germany, has the financial firepower to solve this problem. This needs to be private money as well. And therefore everything that helps creating investment is good for Germany or for Europe. So capital market union, I mean, we need it definitely. We needed it actually years ago, but now it's time to put it into place, banking union included. I think we should use the public money differently than before. So it has to work for a private market. I give you one example. We in Germany, we are giving export guarantees and investment guarantees abroad. So when someone is building a factory in, let's say, China or maybe Cambodia or Vietnam or whatever, they can come to the German government, they pay a little fee, like an insurance fee, and then the German state gives a guarantee: if something is not really working, there's a market turbulence, an overthrow of the government, whatsoever, we insure your investment. We're not doing it in Europe. Why? Because our understanding is that this is against the competition
laws in Europe. This is, of course, an advantage. But why should we not define specific sectors where there's a risk to invest in, let's say AI, for example, maybe defense technology, maybe quantum computing and maybe fusion, something where you can say, well, we need it, this would be a huge advantage for Europe, but the outcome is uncertain, but we want you to invest in it, and therefore this is a level playing field for all the investments. Therefore the public money is guaranteeing, in a way, that at least you're not losing your money. And I think that would be wise to do, at least develop something like this, that private money is more attracted to the European market. And otherwise it would be impossible to unleash these 800 billion euros that are really needed in the European market annually. So every year someone has to spend 800 billion euros.
Host 00:26:03
So while we're on that topic, you would be in support of an integrated banking system.
Robert Habeck 00:26:07
Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, I just said I wish we had more common European answers, and this is just the basic. Yeah. I wish actually that Denmark would enter the eurozone and that maybe Norway would enter the European Union. But these are long shots. This is a short shot. So this is just technique. And as three Germans are sitting here at the table speaking, everyone is nodding: yes, yes, we should do it. Then you go to the Germanasa and FKbank [unclear] and they say, well, yeah, but we don't want to be integrated in this banking union system, because we have our own insurance systems. Without Germany it will not work. So in a way we have to solve the problem also, and do our own homework in Germany and help finding solutions, which are all possible. This is not rocket science, but it demands some political leadership.
Host 00:27:03
And I mean, apart from enhancing the EU fiscal capacity, are there also institutional reforms that you could think of when we look at the EU?
Robert Habeck
Yes, of course. I mean, if we should develop Europe more into the direction of, in the end, maybe something like the United States of Europe, I would say the best, or the next logical step, would be that the European Parliament is voted for on the European scope. So now the parliament is put together with different parties on a national basis. So there's no common, of course, some of the parties try to overcome it by saying, now this is our European running mate for the party. But you can't vote for them if you have a German candidate. You can't vote for the German candidate in Spain. It's on the German list, and then he or she is representing the party in other countries as well, but you can't vote for them. So having, like a federal election maybe in Germany, having common lists, I think this would create some authority
for the parliament and also would be the next step for a really integrated European democracy. And then, of course, other reforms are necessary. I mean, I'm a strong advocate to include the West Balkan countries into the European Union, but if they all got a commissioner, this is like, how many commissioners shall we do, like 40 in the end? This becomes too complicated. So we need a structural reform that not every country every time got a commissioner. Maybe, I mean, one proposal could be that you create kind of blocks, and out of three countries, four countries, five countries, always one becomes a commissioner, so that you have a circle maybe, and every fourth term your candidate from your country is there. So that the Western Balkans, the Baltics, the Nordics, the Central Europeans, the South Europeans, they always have to agree. But maybe there are better ideas, and it's not the geographical unity, because you could argue that there are too many tensions. But other ways to reduce the number of cabinet members, but things like this, I think, need to be discussed. And there's actually nowadays nobody's really discussing it. I mean, the European Union is under pressure. So the
real demand is now to do less European politics. So the right-wing parties are accurately advocating to reduce the influence of the European Union. So everything I just said is like, Robert, I wish this is the world that we could create, but the reality in European politics is that every country is trying to weaken the authority of the European Commission. Unfortunately, from my point of view.
Host 00:30:37
I feel like that is usually because it's the easiest way of, I mean, it's easy to find or to blame someone and then finding the easy solution.
Robert Habeck 00:30:48
That's one reason, but also, I mean, the German chancellor or the German ministers are elected in Germany, and the French president will be elected in France. So if they travel to the council and come back to their country, the first question of the journalists or maybe the public is: what do you have achieved for France, Germany, Spain, Portugal? This is a structural problem. So there's no European electorate where someone is saying, well, yeah, this is maybe in the short term not in the very deepest interest of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, whatever, but it will help Europe, and a strong Europe will help Belgium, Denmark, Germany. Because, and I experienced it myself, when I went home from, I did all these negotiations about the Green New Deal, like 20 files, different files, and always the question was at home: how much money is Germany putting into the fund? Are we losing money? Are we getting money? And if I would have said, yes, maybe in the beginning we lose some money, but this is good for Bulgaria, Romania and, I don't know, Poland, and Poland becoming climate neutral and stick to the European, is good in the end for Germany. This is too long in the argumentation. Nobody's buying the argument. They want to have: you put in 100 euros, how much euros is Germany getting out? And if it's not
100 but less, you're a bad negotiator. Yeah, this is how the game works, basically. And with this approach we never will be competitive against China, because everyone, in a way, is reducing Europe to a nice coffee breakfast club or something like this. This is not enough.
Host 00:32:43
Yeah. No, for sure. And I mean, we talked about how we can potentially tackle the investing issues and encourage investing into Europe. Then when we look at current AI leading companies and leading AI infrastructure companies, and we have to be honest, they don't sit in Europe right now, right? We look at the US and then we see Nvidia or Palantir, or we look over to Asia. And maybe to look at the other side of the equation, and also for Europe as a whole, what do you think is necessary to ensure that Europe doesn't fall behind and that made-in-EU companies can also sit at the forefront of innovation here?
Robert Habeck 00:33:20
So, two things, basically. The first one we just discussed, and just to give you another example how difficult it is to let the nice and fine words of a united Europe be followed by political action: the trade negotiations with the Americans, Donald Trump putting tariffs on products from Europe. We are really harmed because, I have to say it unfortunately, basically Germany, but also France and all the other member states, they looked into their own business interests. So I think France argued for, I don't know, red wine, I guess. Germany argued for the automotive industry. And nobody said to [unclear], okay, whatever you do, I back you, be strong, be decided and push Trump's attempt back. Everyone said, yes, but please be strong, but please, can you find some nice solutions for red wine, automotive industries and whatever, port wine in Portugal, I guess. And I don't know what Danish demands was. And this is weakening the European position. And unfortunately, I think, as Germany is the strongest economy, the German role was not to the European advantage in this case. But this means that concrete action is needed, and not only nice words of, well, we stand together and European unity and so on and so forth. And the second is exactly the point you mentioned, and I think we tackled it already
like 10 minutes ago. Our competitiveness depends on the developing of new technologies, and in a way we have to admit that the competition for deep language models is maybe right now lost. My reading is that it's really hard to step up now with ChatGPT. But on the other hand, if we use the data we have, that is in the German Mittelstand and the companies in the old industries, in manufacturing, for example, we could develop AI technology and maybe have better access to data than other countries have. Oh, sorry. I think it's me. Sorry. I have to
shut this down.
Host 00:35:43
No worries.
Robert Habeck 00:35:44
So, sorry for this. So, but this means that we need an approach to develop AI and not regulate us to death, and also there, I guess, stick to the plan. So, yeah.
Host 00:36:03
But I think, do you think that we need to implement a certain incentive for entrepreneurs or founders of companies to kind of see the economic benefit in going down that path, instead of rather seeing an attractive opportunity in serving already existing and predominant companies and technologies? For example, when we look at now, with Amazon indicating that they want to invest huge amounts into Germany and Spain to build data centers, and then people rather see an objective to build data centers for these companies or to supply energy to them instead of creating their own products.
Robert Habeck 00:36:44
I mean, investment is fine. I would say my answer to this would be, if I would be a European leader, I would be skeptical to store all the data, that sensible data, on Amazon servers. Because, I mean, you see what's happening in the US, how all these tech bros are, how should I put that nicely, crawling to Trump's feet, maybe because they, I don't know. So what if Trump demands from them not to give access to European data? What if Elon Musk is cutting off Ukraine or maybe also Europe from Starlink? What if Elon Musk decides, because someone is harsh on the German AfD, which he fall in love with, I don't know why, but that's a problem, saying your satellites will not be transported by SpaceX into space? Then we have a problem. So I would say in critical infrastructure, public data, defense data, security data, they should not be stored on American and obviously not Chinese servers, but that must be a European cloud system. And there are some, I think the biggest German cloud system is developed by the Schwarz Group, the
owners of Lidl. Why? I mean, they have Lidls everywhere, also in Copenhagen, and there's a lot of sensible data. The customers have the customer card. That means the company could know how much money you spend, therefore you can estimate how much you earn, how the income is, maybe how much family members you have, if you have children, if you don't have children, when you do shopping. That could create some knowledge of your private life. So they need a safe data system. This would be a dramatic scandal if, company like Lidl, the data would become public. So they created a huge cloud infrastructure system, and they always, when I was in office, they asked me what I could do to convince the German government that they should store their data on their system. And I tried. I don't know what has happened in the past three or four or five months since I left office, but it was hard to convince them, because Amazon and others made maybe the cheaper offer, or maybe they had a tradition of using the Amazon service. But I think the public procurement includes also the use of data, and there the public sphere could make a big difference.
Host 00:39:42
Yeah. And talking about sensitive data from the defense industry, I think Palantir entered I don't know how many contracts with different police departments in different states across Germany. [...] And I work on one project where we look at the contractual agreements of cloud providers with financial institutions. And when you look at these contractual agreements, it's very important, like once you're in the contract, they make it very difficult and very expensive to migrate the data and egress.
Robert Habeck 00:40:23
Well, it's the same like private, if you have, I don't know, Apple, or maybe Signal and WhatsApp. You can't communicate between Signal and WhatsApp. So they really try to bind you into their system. That's true. And of course with data, the growth is exponential. So if you have the data and you use the data, the data becomes more and more and more. So the advantage for the system, I don't think that Palantir maybe the best software, but they have the advantage of time. They are now, I don't know how long they are in the market. And if a German or European startup would step up and say, we can do the same, maybe even better, they don't have the access to that amount of data. But is it an answer, or does it just mean that we should be dependent on Palantir and X? I don't think so. This, in a world like that, is so in a way dangerous. The Europeans should try to do better and develop these software systems. And then, okay, we are in a defensive right now, but somehow we have to shape the attitude to not playing not to lose, but playing to win.
Host
Mhm. I mean, maybe moving a bit back from technology, data, etc., and looking on your time in government.
When Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, this represented a historic [unclear] in Germany. And you had to make compromises in that time due to the geopolitical situation. And you also traveled to the Donbas in 2021 and became the first prominent Green politician to say that not acting is worse than acting, if I quote you.
Robert Habeck 00:42:32
I argued that we need to support Ukraine also with weapons,
and that was not only in my party but all over the political floor. This was like breaking the taboo.
So there was no support at all. Not from the conservative party, not from the left party obviously, but yeah.
Host
Mhm. And how, or did this change your view on pacifism, or understanding pacifism and responsibility and the use of force? Because I mean, this is a completely new situation for every European. Yeah, the table has turned.
Robert Habeck
This is the case. And maybe pacifism, I don't know if I would call myself a pacifist ever. I can't stand maybe fighting and maybe killing someone, but I mean, I was brought up, raised, and I was 18, 19 and did my civil service at the age of 19, 20, when the Cold War was coming to an end. So everything was Cold War, and I could not see any reason to do this service in the Cold War, because this was just like a stuck situation. Now we have a hot war, and that's something completely different. In a hot war you can't, that was my lesson learned when I was in Ukraine. Neutrality does not mean that you don't have any responsibility. So, you know, the saying was Germany won't export weapons in
zones of conflict. And it sounds nice in a way, because in zones of conflict the weapons are actually used, and someone will be shot or maybe killed by your defense products. But of course in a zone of conflict, or when there's a conflict, normally you have an aggressor and one that is the victim. So saying I'm neutral, I don't engage, means not that you don't have any responsibility or that you're not guilty. You become guilty just the other way now. And when in Ukraine, that time it was in May '21, I think, I was visiting the front line actually, I was in the town of Mariupol, where later on the fighting and the [unclear] happened, and drones were there already. So the Ukrainian soldiers I talked with asked me, the German politician: why don't you support us, helping us shooting down the drones? Our comrades are killed by the drones. Every day they come and they try to, and they're killing us. And you have the possibilities to give us to shoot them down. There's some machine guns, like, now, they haven't asked for Gepard tanks, but just some artillery stuff, which the name I forgot. And then you should say, no, this is a zone of conflict. I mean, you are killed by the Russians, who
are obviously the aggressors, but we have found this nice saying of we don't export weapons in zones of conflict. I could not said that in that time. This was like being a traitor to these soldiers that explained their lives and their sufferings to me. But it means, of course, for politicians and in politics, it means that you have to make a decision: either you develop your attitude from the reality, solving the problems that are there, or you develop your attitude, or the approach, from the party program, the theory, in a way. And I made the decision to at least, best I can, try to analyze what's happening in reality and to solve the problems in reality. Of course, I don't forget that global warming is happening, and I don't lose my idealistic approach to politics, but idealism without doing something in reality is just talking. So that was always my approach. And yes, you're right, that brought me into conflicts with a lot of, I would say, basic insights some clever politicians, including my party, had. But basic insights sometimes are nothing worth when the reality is not reacting to your basic
insights. So of course it's bad to produce weapons, and of course it's a problem to sell them or to give them to other countries. Yes, it's a problem, but the other problem is even bigger, not to do it, sometimes at least.
Host 00:47:32
For sure. I think also with that personal anecdote, when you actually hear from real people and see with your own eyes what's happening, instead of reading it on the news and still being at a fair distance, obviously, would think, safe to say, would probably have an impact on every
Robert Habeck
These soldiers at that time told me that they could see which sniper unit from the Russian side is on duty, because the final training of the snipers was done at the front. So the snipers, the Russian snipers, trained to shoot Ukrainian soldiers, and one unit shot them in the eye, one unit shot them in the forehead, and one unit shot them in the throat. So they could see, like every two months the unit changed, and now they were losing soldiers because unit I or unit delta or beta or whatever was there. And I mean, if you hear stories like this, it feels different sitting in your nice warm chair at home or listening to party politicians saying, yes, but we don't deliver weapons in zones of conflict. I mean, you see the faces, and these were young soldiers. So that made a big difference for me. Yes, actually.
Host 00:48:52
No, I agree. Also, a very good friend of mine, his father is a politician in Ukraine, and he grew up in Germany. So I'm lucky that I wasn't directly impacted, but I think it also really showed me how serious this is, despite not being actively involved myself, luckily, of course. And I mean, when we look at the situation in Europe, or globally, the global geopolitical climate right now is everything but relaxed, I would say. I mean, that is obviously also due to Russia, due to complicated relationships with China. And earlier we talked about how we should foster internal collaboration within Europe. But what do you think should the role of Europe be when it comes to cooling down global geopolitical tension and maybe not to reactivate a sort of Cold War atmosphere, while not moving too far away from Europe's own strategic objectives?
Robert Habeck
From my point of view, the role of Europe is defined in the history of the European Union. And the very idea of the European Union is to limit power. That is the idea. It was created, the European Union, after the Second World War, I would say after the experience of all these horrible wars Europe went through in the past centuries. So the idea was to limit power. Not the country with the strongest army has the power to just invade another country, as the Nazis did coming from Germany. Not the
ones who are coming from a dynasty should decide which politics are in place. Not the ones owning the big social media platforms should decide how political debate should be organized. Therefore all this regulation stuff was invented, and therefore democracy developed. The very idea of the European Union, and I would say the very idea of democracy, and this is what Europe stands for, for me, is that power can change. You have to accept that the law is limiting your power. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose. That's bad when you lose. You don't like losing. Okay. But if you play according to the laws, then you have to accept it. And what's happening now, outside of Europe, sometimes inside of Europe, a lot of political actors are not playing to the rules, are not accepting losing and not accepting the limitation of power. Obviously Trump and Putin, I would say they hate limitation of powers. Whatever they have in mind, they want to have unlimited power. That's for sure. China is more complicated, I would argue. But it's definitely not that Xi Jinping likes losing or wants to have someone that is above him, including not the law. So there's a lot of pressure on the European Union. But your question was what role should Europe play? This role, this is the founding story
of the European Union: that whatever's happening in the world, our role is always to advocate for the possibility that power and power influence can change and that it's limited. And liberal democracy is the best political system so far that has invented in the history of mankind. That's the European role.
Host 00:52:16
I mean, we're talking a lot about past and future here, but maybe looking back at your time in government. I mean, I certainly have the impression that you are, which is a rare occasion for a politician, very reflected and very authentic. And I think this half an hour or 45 minutes that we just talked really confirmed that impression that I had before doing this podcast. So could you maybe tell us, are there decisions or assumptions that you, with today's knowledge, would have done differently during your time in
Robert Habeck
Probably there are, yeah.
Yes. Well, obviously, I mean, I lost some debates, and the, in Germany at least, well-known debate was about the Gebäudeenergiegesetz, GEG, they called it a heating law, in a way. And of course, with the knowledge of today, how harsh the debate was, I would have done things differently, because I lost it, actually. In that time, for me, I'm asking myself this question quite often, or have asked myself this question quite often, it was, I would say, impossible to see that this becomes such a disaster, because we were in the winter 2022/2023. The gas was gone. Putin stopped the gas supply for Germany in September. I was really in the fear that we wouldn't have enough gas to heat the houses, basically. So imagine that, and not speaking about the economic disaster if we would only had high energy prices but no energy at all. So we did, I would say, crazy things, like not heating the public buildings over 18°. We shut down the public lighting of all the monuments and buildings in the inner cities. I think the shop windows had to be darkened after 9:00 or so. We debated how long you should shower, because I read in some articles that the average German is showering 12 minutes. And I somehow laughed
about it and said, 12 minutes? I mean, what are you doing under the shower? And what about 2 minutes? And then we save a lot of energy, because also some water is heated by gas in Germany. And so these were the debates. This was the reality on the ground. And in this row of sometimes crazy, or at least funny, things we decided in the government, I thought it's a nice thing, or a wise thing, that broken gas ovens should not be replaced by another new gas oven, because we had to reduce our gas consumption. And that was the starting point. But when the law became public in February 2023, the general mood of the people had changed. So, I mean, this is a hypothetical question, but what would have happened if this law became public in November? Maybe nothing would have happened. But in February the winter was over, nothing has happened. We experienced, in a way, these paradoxes that if you prevent a crisis, so you don't experience the crisis, you don't give any credits, but people just think, well, it wasn't so bad. And that was my mistake, of course. I mean, as a politician, the one thing you have to do is understand the debate and the public, the mood of the people,
and to explain, maybe translate, to the people according to their mood why some decisions are necessary, why we have to go this way or that way. So this is, I mean, this is the basic political job you have to do. This is the difference being an expert, knowing everything, and winning the argument. So as a politician you always have to find an argumentation, or at least [unclear], a path to the public that allows you to bring your argumentation forward. And this was my mistake. But in general, I think, that was of course hard and I paid a price for it, but in general I think we, the government and also myself, the people I worked with, developed a lot of things that were right, maybe a little bit before that time. But now I see that, I would say, everything I haven't achieved in the government but that was on my table is now be done by the government of Friedrich Merz. So I have the nice life in Copenhagen and they're doing all the work, doing the good stuff that I develop. Good luck with. Okay.
Host
And, but I think, I imagine that to be really hard, I mean,
being a politician, working, solving things and then getting the backlash.
Robert Habeck
Yes. Both. I mean, you pay a price, of course. Private life is not so private anymore. And everyone has an opinion about you without ever having met you. But on the other hand, you have, I would say, the privilege basically to do the things you really think are important. And there's a big difference between being a professor, maybe having a company, which also is a great responsibility, big responsibility, or being a minister, chancellor, whatever, vice chancellor, and your decision affects almost everyone. This is a big responsibility and a big opportunity as well. So if you believe in your own ideas, and maybe also your personal power, there's no reason to complain. So I mean, the time in government was maybe the hardest work, or time, of my life so far, but also the most, how do you say, satisfying time of my life. So no need to be sorry for the poor politicians. This is voluntarily. Nobody has forced me. Nobody has forced anyone to do the job. Friedrich Merz had a nice, wonderful job at BlackRock before. Now he decided to became the German chancellor.
This is just his decision. This does not mean, of course, that everything is fine and we should not reflect about social media, the use of social media, the emotions in the political debate. So I mean, there's enough room for doing better, but you should not pity politicians. Not me, at least.
Host 00:59:19
And you mentioned Friedrich Merz now a couple of times.
Robert Habeck 00:59:23
Two times.
Host 00:59:25
So, I mean, when you were running for chancellor in Germany, obviously your main opponents were Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz. Now I've mentioned him two times as well. And us as voters and as German citizens, obviously we followed the political agenda from all of you and your political parties through your public appearances, and then also, just shortly before the elections, through the two debates that you had. But I also imagine, next to running, you're also still working as a politician and you're balancing those things at the same time, but then also your opponents are doing the same thing. So I imagine that you also have a common meeting ground next to running against each other in that race, maybe even at the cafeteria of the parliament during lunchtime. So
could you maybe give us a peek behind the curtain, how
kind of the relationship between you guys was during that time, especially when it comes to working together next to running against each other?
Robert Habeck 01:00:31
Well, of course it differs. Some people you like as a person, and sometimes you don't agree with them as a politician. So I would say my personal relationship with Christian Lindner was intact until the end, and he was funny and he was sharp, and we came along personally quite well. But as a politician, I haven't understood him at the end. And sometimes, when the debates become too strong and the differences are too big and you don't feel like you understand the other person anymore, then this affects, of course, your personal relationship as well. So in the end we hadn't that much contact anymore. But I mean, this is public knowledge, I guess. But in general, I never really got used to the situation that in private, or in the cafeteria as you said, you just sit and you do some talking and everyone said, well, yeah, see you in parliament, and then you go into parliament and then the same person said: you are the biggest
idiot ever, how can you be so stupid, you just, whatever. And that was, I mean, maybe others would say that I have done the same. I hope not, actually. But of course you have a blind spot when you talk about yourself. But I think, in a way, professional behavior means accepting that in public the debates are more focused, they have a hard edge or sharp edge. Maybe that's okay. But between having a harsh and rough, and maybe also, how should I put it, robust debate, and attacking one with a personal integrity, this is something different, I would say. And yeah, but I mean, no reason to complain, actually. So this is normal political life, but sometimes there's this gap in what you think that people think of you and what you hear that people are saying. But I guess the same is true for other people. They would say the same about me. That's
Host 01:03:02
And I mean, you don't have to mention any names or any specifics here, but one thing I'd also be curious about here is, would you ever have conversations with people in your political opposition where you would maybe discuss or challenge each other's views in discussions that would happen behind closed doors?
Robert Habeck
From my experience, not because I learned from them, from another party, but because there are some problems that maybe other parties have better answers already, or they have at least answers. So in my time in office, and this is maybe interesting for business school, and it is still now a point of debate and was in my time: should we do industrial politics, should we develop an industrial strategy? And the point is that, I would say, the golden rule in German politics is we don't do special sector politics, we have a common market approach. We define our market rules, like loans and workforce and bureaucracy, and then let's go, everyone, startups, Mittelstand, industries, you just have all the same circumstances and the best might win.
And I accept this. So I hadn't on the agenda the plan to do industrial politics. That was not my plan. I wanted to transform the German energy-intense industry, leading the way to growth and climate neutrality combined, both. That was on my agenda. Then the war in Ukraine happened, we lost the gas, the prices were skyrocketing, and suddenly the energy-intense industry had huge problems. They couldn't produce anymore. And then I developed models like a specific price for electricity for the energy-intense industries, not because I think this industry is so beautiful, or maybe not because this was on my political agenda, but it was necessary. Otherwise, as we see now, because they do now a similar thing, the now acting government, this industry wouldn't survive. And then I found out that some of these concepts, more in the traditional part of the Social Democratic Party, were already established. Nobody really dared to speak about it, but then I could make use of it. So yes, things like this are happening, from my experience, or the way I did things, out of a practical problem. I needed to solve some problems, and the answers, I took them wherever they were available, and then sometimes you learn from other parties. But it's not that, it doesn't, yeah, well, I think this
answers your question, coming from the practice.
Host 01:06:06
I think this also just answered my last serious question that I had in my mind. So, switching to a bit more personal note now. I mean, after leaving the government, you described the need to step back from the too tight corset of Berlin politics and to regain the ability to receive rather than to only send. What is it like waking up as a normal civilian after having worked in politics for such a long time?
Robert Habeck 01:06:44
That's great, basically. So, I mean, of course I think about what's happening in the world, and now I'm here in Copenhagen. I was once in the US. I'm going to other countries in the coming months. So my perspective has changed. I'm looking more from outside now to Europe and to Germany. And of course this changes your view, and you learn different approaches. So, I mean, for example, in the US everyone is hoping that you will follow the path of climate action. So from their perspective, we are the ones that can hold the world in a way of transformation. From, I would say, the German and the European debate, as you just quoted, maybe we are overdoing it. Maybe we do too much climate action. Well, not obviously because we actually do too much. We are too slow, basically. But others are doing not so much, and maybe we should just reduce our climate goals, not speed up everything. But from the outside, from the other context, most of the other politicians are saying, well, please, Europe, go on and be strong by this. But privately, of course, I mean, you give a lot away when you are in public service, and now I have it back, or at least I get it back. But also, like
normal things, just to tell the story: I had some hard time finding this place. I was driving around with a bicycle around Copenhagen Business School, not knowing where to go, because I had to find out, and I don't know why, Google Maps showed me a different place, and then I called you and then we found us. When I was a minister, someone else was, and maybe some police officer was sent before, I checked out the place, and when I arrived, basically by car, someone was opening the door and saying, here, this is the way to go. So you don't have to organize your own private life. But of course you lose it in a way. So I forgot all my PIN numbers for my credit cards, because I never really used my credit cards. I have to now update my mobile phone. All the stuff of living and working now in Denmark, I did alone, and I was sitting with all the other, like, normal people on the bench and waiting until I was called in. I mean, I think this is getting on normal people's nerve. For me, this is like experiencing the new normal life again. So yeah, personally, I gained a lot of freedom and I'm really enjoying it.
Host
And I mean, there are worse things than biking around the beautiful Copenhagen.
Robert Habeck 01:09:35
That's true. But when you look at your watch, which I don't have, and see it's becoming late and you're waiting, then you have some pressure.
Host 01:09:45
[...]
Robert Habeck 01:09:46
Yeah. Well, you have time.
Host 01:09:49
We're happy to wait. No. And I think it's probably a nice aspect that not many people consider, in an afterlife after politics. And I mean, outside of your career in politics, now you lean into academia and into research. Do you have any objectives in that field, or is there anything you want to achieve or gain out of that specifically?
Robert Habeck 01:10:12
I don't know right now. So for me, my thinking was, I worked for climate action, for renewable energy, reduce CO2 emissions for 20 years. So basically the red line, or the narrative, in my political career was always the green issue, in a way. And I think still it's necessary to do that, but of course global warming is now happening. So in a way I changed the perspective and said, okay, what's happening on the security side if global warming is coming now? And I mean, you could think about a lot of places, and basically if you would ask some AI program, please identify, let's say, the 10 hotspots worldwide where global warming would create some tensions and maybe some conflicts and maybe some wars, they would do it. I decided to work on the Arctic, because when I came to Copenhagen, the Greenland issue, Trump wanting Greenland as being part of the US, was everywhere, and the Arctic is very much interconnected with the Baltic Sea. So the push from Russia to the west, to the northwest, is very much on my political agenda, and this is what I'm doing now. And this is, of course, only part of a bigger picture, that global warming and a different climate,
which will come, this is decided, even if we do everything right in the future, which does not look like it, still global warming would happen. And that means, for example, that the Arctic will become, the ice is melting. In the mid of this century the pole will become ice-free, at least in the summer months. Ship routes are opening up. The access to raw materials is possible. Suddenly you don't have to drill through the ice, but you can maybe explore it, at least near the coast, in ice-free [unclear]. Russia is moving forward, China is moving forward. This is the reason why the US is reaching out to Greenland. And this is like a blueprint for other conflicts, where maybe some water is missing and people suddenly have to cope with a completely new and difficult and dangerous climate situation. So this is what I'm working on, and it helps me to understand the backdrop of what I have experienced in my life in office. And how long I'm going to do this and what I'm going to do with this, I don't know. If you ask me, would you ever enter politics, I have to say I don't know. And this is the best for me to say, because in the last 20 years I knew all the time what's next. You had an office, there was an election, you campaign and you get the next office: party leader, minister, going to the federal level, again campaigning, party leader, next office. So the last
20 years I was like in a tunnel, running all the time, and now suddenly the tunnel is gone and I look to the horizon, say, ah, there's a possibility, this you can do, there's an opportunity. And I think I need just some time to recover, and then we see.
Host 01:13:28
I mean, that actually would have been our last question, if you would ever have a future interest to return back to politics. But also, outside of that, I mean, you still have a lot of expertise and also, I think, a very valued opinion by a lot of people. And I think that's in a completely different sector, but when we look at one of your past co-workers, Christian, he recently announced his next steps after politics, where he's going into advisory roles. And I wouldn't say that you would ever do it in the same fashion, but do you see an option down the line where you would leverage your knowledge and your expertise in a relatively impactful role as well?
Robert Habeck 01:14:09
I don't know. So for Christian, I can just say I wish him really the best of everything. Though I was very angry about his party and him when our government split. He has to create now a new life, and I can only say good luck with that. And I mean it not cynically. I really mean it. Good luck. And what I'm going to do, I don't know. So right now I'm really glad that I can earn some decent money in academia and do the research I'm doing, and maybe using my knowledge to help other people from outside Europe understand what's happening in Europe. Maybe help some Europeans to find an approach to solve some political problems. That's enough for me right now. So, I have no idea what I'm going to do in two years or five years or six years' time, and I think having no idea is the very definition of freedom, and right now I'm enjoying this freedom.
Also intellectually.
Host 01:15:17
I'm pretty sure that we were able to meet some of these objectives, at least for our listeners today, which is great.
No, no, definitely. And maybe to finally round up the very interesting, insightful conversation we had today. Because, I mean, when we found this podcast, the objective of the podcast was, in times of AI information overload, it's very important for younger people like us to ask questions, to ask the right questions. Some might say there are no wrong questions, so just important to be curious. And I think a good question to you to finalize this podcast would be: I mean, many young people like our audience are overwhelmed by every crisis, the polycrisis, and disillusioned with institutional politics. What is one message you would offer to specifically Gen Z as they confront an uncertain future?
Robert Habeck 01:16:12
Engage. Decisions, otherwise others are making the decisions. So this is, I mean, this is the basic rule of democracy. It's about them who decide to engage, and you can't complain if you don't at least try to make a difference. And, I mean, the history of civilization is basically telling the story: we can solve all the problems. I mean, we are creating all new problems all the time. Yes, true. But then these new problems are going to be solved, and then it's an ongoing process. Be part of the process and not just leave it to others. If you leave it to others, okay, it's a personal decision. Fine. But then you can't complain that the others are just idiots and doing everything wrong. You have to do better.
Yeah.
Great.
Thank you. Thank you so much. This was great.
Host 01:17:08
No, thanks a lot, Robert. It was a pleasure.
Okay, great. And to our audience that probably, or hopefully, watched until now: make sure to, as always, you know the drill, subscribe, leave a comment if you found something particularly interesting today, and leave a like. And if you're interested, you could also check out what Robert is doing right now at the Dansk Institute for International Science [unclear].
Exactly. Yeah.
Yeah. So, thank you for tuning in, and then we'll hear you in two weeks.